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Comments on the devolution of the 'culture' bills 
February 20, 1995 
A MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE DEVOLUTION OF POWER CONCERNING 
CULTURAL AFFAIRS TO THE PROVINCES 
-ooo-
INTRODUCTION 
This Memorandum responds to the following: 
1 
(1) Proposed amendments to the Culture and Promotion Act, No. 
35 of 1983; 
(2) Proposed amendments to the Cultural Affairs Act, No. 65 
of 1989; and 
(3) correspondence from Gauteng 
Recreation, Arts and Culture. 
Ministry 
I. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED 
of Sport, 
1. This problem arises in the context of the devolution of power 
concerning cultural affairs from the national government to the 
provinces, pursuant to sections 126 and 235(8) of the Constitution. 
Schedule 6 mentions 'Cultural Affairs' . Pursuant to section 
235 (6) (a) (ii) and (b) 1 , there devolves to the Provincial 
authorities all laws with regard to culture, except insofar as 
their subject-matter falls under Sec. 126(3) (a) the only 
subsection of §126 that conceivably seems relevant. 
2. §235(8) contains provisions that triggers the present 
discussion. Under that section, by proclamation in the Gazette 
the President must assign the administration of the laws involved 
to the provinces. In doing so, he may amend or adapt the law to 
regulate its application or interpretation. [§235(8) (b) (i ) ]. He 
may also 'regulate any other matter necessary, in his or her 
opinion, as the result of the assignment, including matters 
relating to . .the transfer of assets ... including funds, to or 
from the national or provincial government or any department of 
state, administration ... or other institution.' 
II. THE NATIONAL MINISTRY'S PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 
1 §235(6) provides that everything mentioned in Schedule 6 
devolves to the Provincial authorities, except matters reserved to 
the national government by the exceptions mentioned in §126(3). 
Sub-section (a) excepts matters 'that cannot be regulated 
effectively b y provincial legislation'; subsection (b), with 
matters that 'to be performed effectively, requires to be regulated 
or co-ordinated by uniform norms or standards that apply generally 
throughout the Republic'. 
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3. In the context of devolution of the two laws mentioned, the 
national Ministry of Culture has suggested certain amendments to 
the two laws mentioned. It is these proposed amendments that lie 
at issue, together with the terms of the Proclamation that the 
Ministry proposes to submit to the President for promulgation. 
This Memorandum (1) critiques the proposals made, and (2) suggests 
alternatives. 
4. The central difficulty with the proposal; (and indeed with the 
two laws involved) concerns their complete abdication of power to 
the discretion of the national Minister. Consider the proposed 
Proclamation assigning the 1983 Act to the Provinces. It recites 
that the President assigns to the Provinces the administration of 
that Act, 'excluding those provisions (if any [sic!]) of the said 
Act which fall outside the functional areas specified in Schedule 
6 of the Constitution or which relate to matters referred to in 
paragraphs (a) to (e) of the Constitution'. That leaves to future 
interpretation every difficult problem connected with the 
devolution. 
5. The amendments do no better. The amendments altogether duck 
the question by using the word 'Minister' to mean either the 
provincial or the national Minister, depending upon whether the 
function involved is properly provincial or national. 2 Read in the 
context of the complete vagueness of the proposed Proclamation, in 
effect this says only this: We are assigning something or other 
concerning culture to the Provinces; we are retaining something or 
other to the Ministry. For example, §2(b) (i) provides that 'the 
Minister" may 'award bursaries to persons in other countries for 
the purposes of study or research in the Republic.' Whether that 
function falls to the national or the provincial Minister of 
Culture depends on whether one thinks that that is a matter 'that 
cannot be regulated effectively by provincial legislation' 
[Constitution, §126(3) (a)], or a matter 'that, to be performed 
effectively, requires to be regulated or co-ordinated by uniform 
norms or standards that apply generally throughout the Republic.' 
Surely that might be argued both ways. (I gather that both the 
national and the provincial ministries contend that they should 
have power to make grants in this area, so the dispute is not 
hypothetical.) In effect, therefore, the proposed amendments merely 
leave altogether vague the scope of power of the national and 
provincial Ministers. 
6. Even more difficult problems arise out of the operation of the 
proposed amendment to §2(3) of the 1983 Act. That is t h e only 
section of the Act that gives the Minister power to make grants to 
artists or other cultural workers directly. The proposed amendment 
2 The Amendment reads that 'Minister' means the national 
Minister 'in so far as the administration of a provision of this 
act has not been ... assigned' to the Provincial administration. 
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would give the Minister power to provides services and to subsidize 
function in connection with culture that the Minister 'may deem 
necessary or expedient on a country-wide basis'. 
7. The proposed amendments to the 1983 Act, §2(3) must be read in 
connection with the devolution of the 1989 Act. I do not have the 
proposed Proclamation concerning that Act. The amendments, are, 
however, unequivocal . Under them, 'Minister' means only the 
provincial authority. As amended, the 1989 Act therefore gives the 
Minister unlimited power to preserve, foster and extend the visual 
arts, music and the literary arts, technology and natural and human 
sciences, the utilization of leisure, 'and such other fields as the 
Minister may from time to time determine'. [§11(1) (f) read with §10 
and §3(1) (c) and (d)]. That is to say, under these proposed 
amendments to the 1983 and the 1989 Acts, the national Minister has 
power to dispense funds and other resources with respect to 
'country-wide' matters, while the provincial Minister has 
jurisdiction over the remaining matters. What is a 'country-wide' 
matter and what is not remains in the discretion of the national 
and the provincial ministers, with nothing to guide them. 
8. If nothing more, that seems a recipe for chaos. 
9. Moreover, the Constitution plainly gives the President the 
power to allocate resources to the provinces as part of the 
devolution process. {constitution, § 
10. The proposed Amendments further muddy the waters. They 
propose to amend subsection 2 by substituting for present 
subsection (3) a provision that provides that 'the Minister may (a) 
provide such services as he may deem necessary or expedient in 
relation to ... culture on a country -wide basis .... ' Remember that 
the amendment states that 'Minister' can mean either the Provincial 
authority, or the national Minister. Presumably, matters of 
culture 'on a country-wide basis' falls within the language of the 
Constitution, §126(3) (a), quoted above (a matter that cannot be 
regulated effectively by provincial legislation) . Literally read, 
that leaves entirely to the discretion of the national Minister and 
each of the provincial Ministers the discretion to spend money on 
anything they please, so long as they deem it to be 'country-wide' 
or not. 
11. That seems a recipe for chaos. 
12. The matter is further compounded by the failure of the 
proposed Declaration to allocate assets and funding to the 
provinces and the region. [See Constitution, §235 (8) (b) (iii)]. As 
the Constitution recognizes, without a devolution of assets and 
funding, devolution remains a hollow shell. 
III. CRITIQUE OF THE EXISTING LAWS 
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13. Both bills as amended seem to leave unnecessarily broad 
discretionary powers in the Ministers, whether provincial or 
national. They have the power to use the funds available to their 
ministries however they choose, so long as the Minister deems it 
'necessary or expedient' -- without even a requirement t hat the 
Minister justify the decision. One might easily construct an 
argument that that violates the Constitution, §24. 3 Even if it 
does not, it basically makes the administration of these two acts 
unaccountable. 
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL 
14. Under the broad powers of the President in connection with a 
devolution under Constitutions, §235(8) (b), I suggest that 
basically a new law be drafted, with the following general 
characteristics. In particular, I suggest that it is imperative 
that some agreement be reached to allocate funding and existing 
assets . For convenience's sake, I append the suggested outline of 
the new bills as a Schedule to this memorandum. That proposal also 
contains suggestions about how to allocate existing estimates. 
What follows is a brief explanation and justification of that 
proposal. 
15. The social problem that presents itself for solution concerns 
the behaviours of officials (subsumed under the term 'the 
Minister' , but really meaning the Ministry) in performing their 
duties to encourage 'culture' . In the past, I gather that two 
complaints have surfaced: First, that the funding went entirely to 
foster the culture of the white minority, and even there, to foster 
elite, not popular, culture. 
16. How to explain those behaviours? First of all, the laws 
themselves (the laws of 1983 and 1989) gave extraordinarily broad 
and unaccountable discretionary powers to the Minister. In effect, 
it gave him the authority to spend over Rl00,000,000 a year for the 
artists and programmes that the Minister deemed "necessary or 
expedient' to support without even a requirement that the 
Minister justify the choices. Experience teaches that that holds 
out great promises for corruption, and certainly for arbitrary 
governance. Absent any real oversight, the Minister surely had 
opportunity and capacity to support culture in terms of racial 
criteria (that was in terms required by the 1989 Act, §2), and, in 
the absence of any machinery to require otherwise, to act without 
any real accountability. In short, the central weakness of the 
3 A Minister might under §2(3) of the 1989 Act, as amended, 
or §3(1) (d) of the 1983 Act, make a grant to a person, and explain 
the action to an unsuccessful candidate (under Constitution, 
§24(c) by stating only that the Minister deemed the award 
'expedient'. That would make an administrative action under §24 
impossible. Other constitutional arguments might be developed. 
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existing Acts lies in their absence of a process that ensures 
accountability bin making grants under them. 
17. Devolution raises four issues. One rests on past experience: 
How to ensure that the provinces do not replicate the same lack of 
accountability that the existing laws permit (and, if amended as 
suggested by the national ministry, will continue to permit)? How 
to ensure against racialism or ethnic exclusivity in make grants or 
giving support to cultural workers? How to allocate responsibility 
for funding different activities between the center and the 
provinces? How to allocate the funds available equitably between 
the center and the provinces, and among the provinces? This 
memorandum discusses each in turn. 
18. Accountability . Two ways conceivably exist to ensure 
accountability. First, the statute (or subsidiary legislation 
under it) might articulate specific criteria for grants or other 
support. That probably comes close to impossible; nobody has yet 
managed to develop those criteria. The proposal therefore adopts 
the second method: Requiring peer review of each proposal, and 
requiring each peer panel to explain the reasons for granting or 
rejecting the proposal . The Minister can then fund or not, 
depending upon the recommendation of the panel,an d the quality of 
its statement of reasons. That provides accountability, for the 
Minister can no long make grants merely because it seems to the 
Minister 'necessary or expedient'. 
19. Preventing racialism or ethnicity in grants. Three ways to 
protect against this suggest themselves. The first would in 
general terms prohibit any ministry (whether national or 
provincial) from taking race or ethnicity into account in making 
grants -- that is, a typical anti-discrimination clause that did 
little more than repeat the substance of the Constitution, §8(a) 
and (b) . That sort of provision becomes almost impossible to 
enforce. As usually interpreted, it requires proof of official 
intent to discriminate - - and persons intent on subverting the 
Constitution or the law do not usually broadcast their purposes. 
A second provision would state procedures to make it possible to 
prove discrimination without proving the official's state of mind. 
The most direct way of doing this would be to compare the racial 
and ethnic content of grants made with the racial or ethnic content 
of applications submitted. Any discrepancy would suggest at least 
prima facie a discriminatory hand at work. A third device would 
try to develop a kind of affirmative action, plainly made 
constitutional by the Constitution, §8 (3) (a). The present proposal 
adopts this solution. It adopts the presumption suggested in the 
second suggestion here, but varies it in two ways. First, it makes 
the presumption of discrimination irrebuttable. Second, to 
determine discrimination, it compares not the correspondence 
between the racial or ethnic profile of the grants and the 
applications for those grants, but between the grants and the 
racial and ethnic profiles of the relevant population I(provincial 
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or national, as the case may be). Because of past discrimination, 
the black and colored populations have fewer artists likely to make 
funding applications than whites. To require funding in accordance 
with population ratios amounts to affirmative action. It is the 
kind of affirmative action, however, that ceases with the need; for 
when black and colored applications match their ration in the 
population, no affirmative action will continue. 
20. Allocation of functions between center and provinces. As 
suggested the proposed amendments do not allocate the functions 
between center and provinces, they only guarantee continuing 
arguments about the problem. Three methods of solving the problem 
suggest themselves. The first is that contained in the existing 
laws and the proposed amendments: The national ministry provide 
services or funding to preserve, develop, foster or extend culture 
'on a country-wide basis'. We suggest that that has almost no 
meaning. One could readily construe that to mean that the 
Provinces can fund little more than murals on the walls of local 
cities and towns. A Minister could easily maintain that all other 
functions -- for example, grants for writing, for visual arts, or 
for theater productions extend culture 'on a country-wide 
basis' . 
A second might in effect give the local and national 
ministries concurrent jurisdiction. The national ministry would 
try to restrict itself to obviously 'country-wide' cultural efforts 
(for example, TV or cinema productions) while the provincial 
ministries would likely favour provincial artists, local acting 
groups, and the like. Nothing would offend the law, however, if on 
e or the other stepped out of their proper roles. 
A third, adopted in the present proposal, would abandon the 
country-wide- formulation as meaningless. Instead, it lists 
specific forms of cultural activities that the national ministry 
may fund: cinema, radio and television productions, and theatre 
production if half of the Provinces guarantee support for 
performances in their Provinces. (Nothing would bar the provinces 
from funding similar activities) . This would remove the question 
of jurisdiction from ministerial discretion. It does bar the 
national ministry from making direct funding to individuals, no 
matter how famous or widely-read. 
21. Allocation of funds between center and provinces, and among 
the provinces. These pose two separate questions. 
a. Between center and provinces. We can see no 
intellectually satisfactory way of making this allocation. If one 
adopts the method of allocating functions adopted here, the 
allocation of funds between center and provinces becomes a function 
of the allocation of their respective functions. What proportion 
of the gross sums expended by the State for culture ought to go to 
cinema, television and radio productions, and to 'national' 
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theater, an d what proportion to all the other aspects of culture? 
Even that division, however, can follow no rational formula. In 
lieu of that, we suggest a procedural solution. The present 
proposal would create a Council of Ministers of Culture. These 
would meet from time to time, an d would annually bargain between 
themselves about the amount to be allocated to each. 
b. Between the several provinces. Again, two possibilities 
suggest themselves. First, the provinces might share these funds 
in proportion to population. That might do serious injustice to 
the metropolitan centers (Johannesburg and Cape Town, 
particularly), which likely have more than their fair share of 
cultural workers. (On the other hand, it might induce some of 
these to move to provinces with small percentages of cultural 
workers, which might be no bad thing) . Second, the proposal adopts 
the solution of taking an inventory of cultural workers, and 
allocating the available funds by the relative number of these in 
each province. (The proposal leavens this suggestion by providing 
for a bonus for deprived provinces (defined as having a smaller 
ration of artists to population than 50% of the national average) . 
This has the great disadvantage of requiring each province to take 
a census of artists and other cultural workers -- a project that 
may prove impossible to define. 
22. Implementation. As do the present Acts, the proposal makes 
use of regional advisory councils, adding a national advisory 
council. It provides sanctions for ministries that violate the 
procedures of the act, or its anti-discrimination provisions, by 
reducing the grant for the succeeding year by the amount of the 
improperly-made grants. 
SCHEDULE A 
SUGGESTIONS FOR A NATIONAL ARTS FUNDING LAW 
--000-
['NMOC' means the national Ministry of Culture. 
Provincial Ministry of Culture.] 
'PMOC' means a 
23. Allocation of funds 
a. Block orants to provinces. The central government to 
make block grants to the provinces for culture. 
b. 
i. Consider whether provinces must make matching 
grants of some percentage (at present, when 
provinces have no independent taxing capability, 
very small or nil; but increasing over the years.) 
[An excellent way to make the Provinces cough up 
support for culture. ] 
=A=l~l~o~c~a~t~i~o~n~~b~e~t_w~e~e~n~~NM~O~C~~a_n~d~~P_M~O~C~s~·~~~All funds 
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appropriated by the central government for culture to be 
allocated between the PMOCs and the NMOC in a percentage 
specified in the law (e.g.: 20% of all funds to go to the 
NMOC, 80% among the several PMOCs) . 
i. As mentioned below, NMOC is limited in the objects 
for which it can spend money; PMOCs are not. The 
question for negotiation is in major part, what 
proportion of culture budget should be spent for 
cultural efforts to which NMOC is limited (bearing 
in mind that PMOCs may also spend money for these, 
but will probably spend greater proportions for 
more locally-presented art (e.g. wall murals, local 
theater groups, supporting art education in 
schools)? [I can no see of way of dividing the 
money between the NMOC and the PMOCs except by a 
negotiated figure. I suggest a way of negotiating 
that figure below.] 
c. Allocation between PMOCs. The 80%(?) of the funds 
allocated to the PMOCs by way of block grants to be 
allocated in proportion to the relative number of 
'recognized artists' in the Province, plus a growth 
factor for provinces that vary more than 50% from the 
country-wide artists-to-population mean. 
i. 'Recoonized artists': This will require each PMOC 
as a condition of receiving a block grant to have a 
current list of 'recognized artists' . 
ii. Exolanation: Cannot divide up the funds available 
in terms merely of population, for probably there 
exists a much higher proportion of artists to the 
population in Jo'burg and Capetown than elsewhere. 
Very difficult problem to decide by what cri teria a 
PMOC is supposed to determine who counts as a 
'recognized artist' and there will be great 
incentive to PMOCs to inflate those numbers. This 
needs more thought. Provinces with low levels 
of recognized artists ought to receive some extra 
money to develop their artistic and cultural 
resources; hence the growth factor for provinces 
far below the national mean. 
24. Powers of NMOC. 
a. Objects of funding. NMOC may fund only the following: 
i. Productions of national interest for television, 
cinema and radio. 
(1) All production to be dubbed in at least one 
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African language; or if in an African 
language, in English (or Afrikaans?) . 
ii. Stage productions of national interest, but only if 
at least 50% (?) of the PMOCs guarantee support for 
performances in the Province. 
iii. International cultural relations (tours for foreign 
exhibits, tours of foreign artists, overseas study 
tours for SA artists and writers. 
iv. With the consent of two or more Provinces, 
assistance in developing artistic and cultural 
educational syllabi in schools and elsewhere, for 
use by Provinces. 
b. All funding must meet criteria below. 
25. Powers of PMOCs 
~ Objects of funding. PMOCS may fund any artistic work 
that meets criteria below. 
26. Criteria for funding 
a. Non-discrimination. Funding must be non-discriminatory 
as to race, ethnicity or gender. 
i. This merely restates the Constitutional 
requirement. 
ii. If funding by NMOC and each PMOC as to amounts (and 
as to numbers? -- needs further thought) does not 
match within 20% the ethnic and gender distribution 
among the recognized artists in the national (for 
NMOC) and the province (for each PMOC) , the funding 
agency will be conclusively presumed to have 
discriminated in making grants. 
(1) Regulations must be worked out to determine 
how to count a group (e.g. a TV production 
unit that receives a grant) for these 
purposes. One idea: If the group's artists 
(actors, directors, cinematogr aphers, 
costumers, producers, but not others) do not 
within 20% match the national or provincial 
distribution, as above, then it counts as a 
grant to the group in the majority. 
( 2) Explanation: As Justice Blackmun of the US 
Supreme Court once said, to get rid of 
racialism sometimes one must take race into 
. 
~C~o~m=m=e~n~t~s~~o~n~t~h~e~d~e~v~o_l~u~t~i_o_n~o~f~t_h_e~_'_c_u_l~t~u_r_e~'~b~i~l~l~s~~~~~~~~-10 
account. This is one of those times. 
b. Substantive criteria. What counts as an artistic or 
cultural project for funding purposes? 
i. This cannot be solved in linguistic terms. I 
suggest that the only way to solve this is in terms 
of peer review. Neither NMOC nor a PMOC may make a 
grant unless a Peer Review Panel (chosen as 
described below) gives an affirmative rating to the 
proposal. 
27. Implementation 
a. Panel of Experts and Peer Review Panels. 
i. Membership. 
(1) The Minister of NMOC and each PMOC to select a 
Panel of Experts, consisting of (say) 21 
members 
(2) Each member to be either an artist, an 
academic involved in cultural work or an art 
critic. It may include members from outside 
the Province. 
(3) The Panel of Experts as a whole must meet the 
ethnic and gender distribution requirements 
mentioned above, and must so far as possible 
represent trends in the artistic world. 
ii. Peer review panels. 
(1) The panel for any particular grant shall be 
chosen by rota or by lot. 
b. Council of Cultural Advisors. 
i. Membership. 
(1) Each cultural ministry to appoint a Council of 
Cultural Advisors (perhaps the same people as 
serve on the Peer Review Panels) to serve as 
an Advisory Council. It may include members 
from outside the Province. 
(2) The Council to include the Chair and at least 
three members of the relevant Parliamentary 
Committee on Cultural Affairs. It might also 
• ~C~o~m~m==e~n~t~s=-~o~n=---t=h==e:.........:d=e=v~o~l~u=t==i~o~n=---o==f----=t=h~e=--'~c~u=l=-=t~u=r~e=-'--=b=i~l==l=s;.._~~~~--~~-11 
include activists in various NGOs concerned 
with the arts and culture. 
( 3) Council to meet at regular intervals (say, 
quarterly?) 
ii. Powers and duties. 
(1) The Council to keep general track of grants to 
ensure compliance with non-discrimination 
provisions above. 
(2) The Council to keep general track of grants 
concerning the relative balance between 
different forms of cultural expression being 
aided by the grants, and to advise the 
Minister if they see a trend favoring one or 
another branch of the arts, or one or another 
school of art or music etc. unduly. All 
advice to the Minister to be made public. 
(3) The Council to submit suggestions to Minister 
concerning membership in the Council and 
membership on the Panel of Experts. 
( 4) The Council to give advice to the Minister 
when requested by the Minister, or on its own 
initiative; except that the Council may not 
comment on particular grants or grant 
applications. 
(5) Council to receive copies of all Ministerial 
documents concerning grants: Grant 
applications, letters of reference to peer 
review panels, reports of peer review panels, 
etc . 
c. Council of Cultural Ministers. 
i. Membership. There shall be a Council of Cultural 
Ministers, consisting of the Ministers and Deputy 
Ministers of Culture of central and Provincial 
governments. 
(1) At meetings of the Council of Cultural 
Ministers, the Minister may attend either in 
person or by a representative. 
(2) The Council shall meet at least twice a year. 
ii. Powers and duties 
• =C~o~m~m==e=n~t=s=---=o=n=---t=h=::;e'--'d=e=v-'-"'o~l~u=t==i~o=n=---o==f--"t=h~e""-_'~c~u=l~t~u=r~e=---'~b=i=l=l~s~~~~~~~~-12 
( 1) The Council of Cultural Ministers to adopt 
uniform Regulations for vetting grants under 
this Act. 
(2) To discuss matters of common interest. 
( 3) To negotiate the proportion of the 
allocation for Culture received as 
grants by the NMOC and PMOCs 
budget 
block 
d. All regulations made by the Council of Cultural 
Ministers, NMOC or a PMOC under this Act to be subject to 
notice and comment, and, in the case of the Council of 
Ministers, and otherwise at the discretion of the 
relevant Minister as advised by the Advisory Council, a 
public hearing. 
28. Sanctions 
a. A Ministry of Culture that does not follow 
mentioned above for making grants (as 
discrimination and as to Panel of Experts), 
grant for the following year diminished by the 





b. A Ministry of Culture may not expend any funds until it 
has in place an Advisory Council and a Panel of Experts. 
